Simpson's paradox is used in the teaching of epidemiology to dramatize the effects of confounding. As Reintjes et al1 note, however, there are few published real life instances of Simp? son's paradox in epidemiology itself. Thus, despite the several engaging examples from other areas,2 many teachers illustrate it using hypothetical data.
given in the Table 1 below. The study-specific odds ratios range from 1.0 to 2.8, but the "crude" odds ratio from the aggregated cell frequencies is 0.7, outside of this range and in the opposite direction. The Mantel-Haenszel summary odds ratio is 1.3.
Usually, confounding is induced by subjects (exposed sub? jects are more likely or less likely than unexposed subjects to have other characteristics that independently contribute to a higher risk of disease) or by patients' physicians ("patients at high risk for urinary tract infection were more likely to be given prophylaxis"1 ). Here, in contrast, the distortion is investigator-induced. The investigators of studies 23 and 34 chose subpopulations living close to power lines (thereby augmenting the percentage who live within 100 m of the lines), while those of studies l,5 4,6 and 57 chose entire populations. But studies 23 and 34 also had the lowest ratio of cases to controls! This co-incidence leads to the extreme artifact in the odds ratio calculated from the aggregated frequencies.
In a logistic regression of pooled subject-level data, includ?
ing covariates, from the five studies, the varying case-control ratios can be dealt with by using the logs of the case-control ratios as "offsets," ie, as study-specific intercepts with known values. In meta-analyses of randomized clinical trials, it is common to derive an effect estimate directly from the aggregated fre?
quencies. This practice produces little distortion, since most trials employ a 50:50 allocation. As our example shows, one cannot be as complacent in the meta-analysis of data from non-experimental studies. 
